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RELIGIOUS LmERTY IN THE MILITARY:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER "FRIENDLY FIRE"
Kenneth Lasson
Though freedom of religion remains one of our most cherished values,
It IS still among the most controversial of constitutional rights.
This is
especially true in the context of military service. Even those who purposefully
enlist in the armed forces, implicitly giving up certain liberties they freely
enjoyed as civilians, would not relinquish their freedom of conscience-yet the
right to practice their religious beliefs, unfettered by arbitrary governmental
restrictions, is regularly challenged.
Fortunately, however, most western cultures regard religious liberty as
so fundamental that their military establishments routinely develop regulations
to accommodate specific religious practices.
This principle was of particular import in the recent conflict in the
Persian Gulf, during which the American government sought to limit the
conduct of its military personnel so as not to offend the religious sensibilities
of fundamentalist Arabs, specifically the host nation of Saudi Arabia. To what
extent such political and strategic restrictions impinge upon basic constitutional
principles is a question that has not yet been fully explored.
This article examines specific restrictions promulgated and practiced
during the Persian Gulf War, provides a brief historical analysis of how the
United States and other nations have traditionally accommodated the religious
activities of their military personnel, and addresses the question of how far we
can constitutionally limit the free-exercise rights of the people in the military
in light of current Supreme Court jurisprudence.

I. Operation Desert Shield
When the United States sent a military force to Saudi Arabia in late
summer of 1990, it is unlikely that the governments of either country
anticipated the sheer variety of religious tensions that would be roiled up by
Operation Desert Storm, nor the constitutional questions encountered as a
result.
Not only do the Saudis have strict moral codes pertaining to women,
liquor, tobacco, dress, and the sanctity of various holy sites, but they strictly
regulate the conduct, comings and goings of all non-Moslems as well. These
concerns, in addition to the promulgation of political policies that are stridently
skewed against America's only democratic ally in the region, Israel, have
caused both the State Department and the Court to walk increasingly fine lines
in order to avoid both political and cultural conflicts.
Thus, for example, early on in the campaign Jewish-American
servicemembers were given the "option" of receiving "non-denominational
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dogtags. "I This offer was followed with a pamphlet issued by the United
States Central Command on sensitive topics to be "avoided or handled
carefully"2-including "articles and stories showing U.S.-Israeli ties and
friendship," "discussing the 'Jewish lobby' and U.S. intelligence given to
Israel," and "referring to the Arab blacklisting of U.S. companies that do
business with Israel or the Arab boycotting of companies that have strong
Zionist representation in executive positions. "3
Beyond the obviously defensible position that military personnel be
afforded the opportunity to disguise their religious identities in the event they
are captured by an enemy, in this case the official governmental overtures
were based on a considerably more dubious policy: the official blind-eye
approach toward Saudi Arabia's grossly discriminatory fundamentalism. Such
diplomatic obsequiousness toward the oil-rich kingdom has been going on
nearly a half-century, and in tum has served to endorse practices that are
clearly anathema to free societies.
Regulating dress and drinking so as not to offend highly conservative
allies is one thing, but repressing religious identity and observances is quite
another. Besides the clear First Amendment problems created by ordering
servicepeople not to discuss certain matters unrelated to specific military
actions, American troops were asked to submerge the values of tolerance,
pluralism, and open-mindedness that have made the United States a unique
democratic society.4 Prior to 1990, Jews and blacks were purposefully denied
assignment to Saudi Arabia. But that situation had to change, of necessity,
when American forces were brought in large numbers-ultimately over
500,000 troops from all the services.
From the earliest months of American military deployment in the
Persian Gulf, various regulations, directives, orders, and advisories sought to
limit religious practices and expressions. Military chaplains, for example,
were ordered to remove insignia showing their religion, and told to call
themselves "morale officers. Also, chaplains were prohibited from being
interviewed by the media, which in tum was forbidden to film any religious
worship services. This was even on bases far away from Saudi citizens or
military personnel, and caused a major negative response among the hundreds
of chaplains deployed in the Gulf. S
Although the Pentagon officially denies there was any substantial
restriction on religious freedom of soldiers and sailors, there is enough
anecdotal material to cause concern. The press was instrumental in
uncovering a number of incidents, long before the official regulations were
acknowledged by the military. Thus it became known that chaplains were told
not to wear crosses when away from the troops, or to use tenns like "Mass"
or "Holy Communion." Some morale services had to be held in secret. And
certain Christmas carols or hymns were off limits (chaplains were told to
II
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substitute "Jingle Bells" for nOh, Come All Ye Faithful"). President Bush
himself, although he declared that we were there "to protect our Arab friends
and the American way of life," changed a planned visit to the front from
Christmas to Thanksgiving, so as not to offend the Saudis. 6
According to one Jewish chaplain, the restrictions on Jews were more
onerous than those placed upon Christians. There was an inadequate number
of Jewish chaplains to cover the estimated 2500 Jewish military personneL It
was difficult to obtain copies of the Old Testament and kosher food. Although
eventually, Christian services on bases were posted, by military order Jewish
services were not. 7
Most, if not all, of these orders and practices may have been the result
of an over-reaction by military commanders and the State Department to a
misperceived sense of the need to defer to Arab fundamentalist sentiments.
It is fairly clear now that the restrictions placed on the troops were much more
the product of Americans than Saudis. 8 For the most part it was friendly fire,
and entirely avoidable.
The senior chaplain in the Persian Gulf theater stated that American
commanders may have floundered at first, but that the Saudis were not very
concerned about what religious activities were carried out on the bases; in fact,
he said, by war's end the religious program in effect was the best he'd ever
seen. 9 The only horror story about the Saudis themselves was that of an
American who reported he'd been severely reprimanded by a Saudi general for
using asterisks in a report he'd done, because they looked too much like the
six-pointed Stars of David. 10 In fact there was no "status of forces"
agreement in Saudi Arabia, the way there is in Germany or other places where
Americans are present in any great numbers. There were only letters of
understanding as to what practices would be accepted and which would be
frowned upon. 11
In the end, the chaplains emerged as heroes. For them it was no small
irony that the rigidly puritanical cultural environment in Saudi Arabia allowed
for greater spiritual opportunities-an anomaly that at the beginning was lost
on American policy-make~s and commanders in the field. 12 By war's end,
the senior chaplain in the Gulf could say that the religious program ultimately
in effect was the best he'd ever seen. From interviews with a number of
military personnel who served in the Gulf, particularly members of the
chaplaincy, a clear picture begins to emerge. Despite the regulations
promulgated from above-from the State Department, the Secretary of
Defense, and others in positions of influence-military personnel from all the
services freely engaged in religious practices. Directives were widely
disregarded. Chaplains refused to call themselves "morale officers." Services
were held for all denominations, on all holidays. Kosher food, while difficult
to obtain on military bases (though kosher MRE's are supposedly being
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discussed at present), was available in Riyadh, as was a Torah scroll flown in
on a military transport from Frankfurt, West Germany. 13 So whatever
restrictions there were seem to have been honored more in the breach than
anywhere else.

ll. Free exercise v. military necessity
Americans abide by the principle that the liberty to choose one's faith
and practice it without inhibition are essential to the function of a free society.
Thus the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."14
The free exercise clause has served to limit the degree to which
government may interfere with the pursuit and practice of religion. 15 There
is controversy, however, as to the degree to which the Constitution permits the
military the power to grant servicemembers less protection of their
fundamental rights than they would be accorded in civilian society. In recent
years a number of cases have enunciated the principle that the military can be
classified as distinct from civilian society, 16 thereby justifying military
interference and restriction of a servicemember's free exercise of religion.
The latest challenges to the free exercise clause have come in the wake
of the Supreme Court's 1990 opinion in Employment Division, Oregon
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.17 Prior to Smith the Court had
generally applied a "strict scrutiny" test in religion cases-that is, for any law
restricting a religious practice to pass constitutional muster, the government
had to show both that the legislation was needed to satisfy a compelling
public interest" and that no less-burdensome course of action was feasible.
Because the strict-scrutiny standard is a difficult one for the state to meet, over
the years various religious practices have been exempted from otherwise
applicable statutes and regulations.
In Smith, however, a sharply divided Supreme Court discarded the
strict-scrutiny test in favor of one that would make constitutional a "valid and
neutral law of general applicability. 1118 The Court held that a state could
enact any statute-even if it happens to restrict a religious practice-so long
as it does not target a particular religion and is uniformly applied to all
citizens. Greater protection of free exercise, said Justice Scalia in Smith, must
be sought in the political process and not through the courts-even though he
recognized that lithe political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in. 1119
Iustice O'Connor, one of four in strong dissent, characterized Scalia's
opinion as "dramatically [departing] from well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence ... unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and ...
II
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incompatible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious
liberty . .,20
More particularly, service members have challenged the
constitutionality of military regulations as violative of their First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion. Supreme Court jurisprudence is
somewhat less than clear as to the degree to which civilians and military
personnel are afforded the same constitutional rights. The Court has held that
"our citizens in uniforms may not be stripped of basic rights simply because
they have doffed their civilian clothes. ,,21 However, the Constitution grants
plenary power to Congress "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and
maintain a Navy," and "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces." 22 Thus it is patent that the Framers intended to
give complete control to the legislative branch over the military establishment,
including regulations and procedures. 23 Consequently the Supreme Court has
traditionally deferred to professional military judgment regarding military
regUlations.
Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutiona1. 24 For example, the
Court has upheld state child labor laws that were used to prohibit the sale of
religious literature by children who were Jehovah witnesses,25 and a federal
statute prohibiting the practice of polygamy as applied to Mormons. 26 In
neither of these cases, however, did the Court set judicial standards as to when
certain religious conduct could be regulated. 27
It was not until the landmark case of Sherbert v. Vemeru that the
Supreme Court offered a formula to guide future courts in deciding when the
government has the right to interfere. In Sherbert, the Court announced the
standard that the state must accommodate religious practice unless it can assert
a compelling interest that cannot be furthered through other, less restrictive
means.29 The case involved the denial of unemployment benefits to a
Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to accept suitable work on her Sabbath.
Based on the "strict scrutiny" standard, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional for a state to deny the benefits since the denial violated her
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion absent a compelling state
interest. 30
Subsequent to Smith, numerous decisions by various lower state and
federal courts have felt constrained by that holding. In the main, free exercise
claims challenging both civil and criminal statutes have been markedly
unsuccessful.
For example, federal courts of appeal have upheld laws which require
blood transfusions,31 autopsies,32 and church contributions to a public social
insurance plan33 -none of which would likely have survived the prior strictscrutiny test.
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Similarly, lower federal courts have found various restrictions on
religion not to violate the Constitution, including the public accommodations
title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (construed to require the Boy Scouts of
America to admit into membership persons who are willing to profess a belief
in God);34 a charitable-solicitations ordinance that imposed disclosure and
record keeping requirements on most charitable organizations soliciting funds
within the city (allowing no exception for religious organizations);35 and the
government's covert surveillance of the worship services and other activities
of churches involved in the sanctuary movement. 36
State court decisions have been to the same effect. Pursuant to Smith
these courts have rejected free exercise claims made by Christian Scientist
parents;37 by a church subjected to a state consumer-use tax on items it
purchased from out-of-state suppliers;38 by homeowners whose erection of
three crosses in their front yard was held to violate the setback requirements
of the city's zoning ordinance;39 and by a church that refused to obtain a state
license for its child-care center because the licensing requirements would have
prohibited it from disciplining children by spanking in accord with its
understanding of the Bible. 40
In four instances to date, courts have resorted to their state constitutions
in order to get around the dictate of Smith. In Minnesota v. Hershberger 41
the court (applying both a strict-scrutiny analysis and its state constitution)
ruled that the Amish had a free-exercise right under the First Amendment to
be exempted from a state law requiring slow-moving vehicles to display
fluorescent orange emblems. In State by Cooper v. French 42 the same court
again relied on the state constitution to uphold a landlord's religiously based
refusal to rent a house to a woman who planned to cohabit with her
fiance-contrasting that conclusion with what is said was the lesser level of
protection afforded religious exercise under Smith. And in Matter of Welfare
ofT.K. and w'K.,43 an appellate court (again in Minnesota) held the religious
conscience provision of the state constitution to be violated by removal of two
children from a home because of the parents' religiously-based refusal to allow
the state to check the quality of their home schooling by way of a standardized
test. Although the court found the state's interest in education to be
compelling, it held removal of the children from the home not to be the least
restrictive alternative available to the state to ensure the educational quality of
their home schooling. Finally, in John v. Donahue,44 a California appellate
court held a landlord who refused to rent to an unmarried cohabiting couple
to be constitutionally exempt under the California constitution from a statute
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status. The court, using a
strict scrutiny analysis, found the state's interest in protecting unmarried
cohabiting couples not to be a "paramount and compelling state interest," but
the burden on the respondents' practice of their religion was "substantial. 45
II
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In sum, state and lower federal court application of the principle of
non-exemption stated in Smith has resulted in the denial of most free exercise
claims, except where the claim has been adjudicated under a state constitution.
In a 1967 case, United States v. Robel,46 the Supreme Court gave
signs of dissatisfaction with this balancing of the competing interests of
government and individuals' interest in First Amendment decisions. Robel
dealt with a congressional statute designed to safeguard the national defense
under its constitutional war powers. The Court refused to "balance" the
government's interests with the individuals' right of association. The Court
said the question was not what interest "outweighed" the other, but instead the
emphasis was on how to avoid the conflict. 47
This departure from balancing individual rights and government
interests continued in Rostker v. Goldberg. 48 There the Supreme Court
considered the appropriate level of scrutiny by which to review a congressional
decision excluding women from draft registration. The competing interests
were the constitutional authority granted Congress to raise and regulate armies
and navies against Fifth Amendment due process prohibition of gender-based
discrimination. 49 As in Robel. the Court determined that each interests could
not be balanced against one other; the real test became how each interest could
be accommodated.
Military necessity
The general confusion as to which level of scrutiny should be applied
has seeped into the military context, where it has been further compounded by
the doctrine of "military necessity."
The military has been given the status of a "separate community." 50
Because of the significance of military goals, the courts have upheld challenges
to military actions which might have been unconstitutional in the civilian
context. 51 Under the doctrine of military necessity, first enunciated in Orloff
V, Willoughby,52 the services can implement their own rules and regulations
beyond the presence of judicial review. 53 As former Supreme Court Chief
Justice Warren observed in support of the so-called Orloff rule:
So far as the relationship of the military to its own personnel is
concerned, the basic attitude of the Court has been that the
latter's jurisdiction is most limited. . .. This "hands off'
attitude has strong historical support, of course . . . it is
indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the time of
the revolution until now, has supported the military
establishment's broad power to deal with its own personnel.
The most obvious reason is that Courts are ill-equipped to
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determine the impact upon discipline that any particular
intrusion upon military authority might have. 54
In 1974, twenty-one years after Orloff, came Parker v. Levy.55 The
case involved statements designed to promote disloyalty and disaffection
among troops destined for Vietnam. The Court noted that "while members of
the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the
military mission require a different application of these protections. 56
Sustaining a court-martial conviction, Parker presented a much different
analysis for a First Amendment challenge than the Court would have used in
a civilian context.
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Glines S7 and Navy v.
Huff. 58 Glines challenged regulations requiring servicemen to obtain prior
approval before circulating petitions on Air Force bases. In a civilian society
such prior restraint would clearly violate the First Amendment, yet the Court
upheld the regulations, again stating that the military's role is one of a
specialized and separate society and that there is a strong need for loyalty,
discipline, and morale to perform the mission. 59 Huff also involved obtaining
approval from base commanders before circulating petitions; the Court again
held that the regulation in question protected the interest in maintaining respect
for duty and discipline vital to military effectiveness. 60
The Court went even further in a 1983 case, Chappell v. Wallace. 61
It held that enlisted armed forces personnel cannot maintain suits to recover
damages from superior officers, when the enlisted men sustain alleged injuries
in the course of military service as a result of constitutional violations.
Therefore, servicemen were not only denied certain remedies for constitutional
violations, but they could not even recover for any injuries sustained as a
result.
This line of cases suggests that if the military wants to bypass the first
amendment, all that is required is an assertion of "military necessity. 1162
There is no requirement to prove that granting a first amendment claim might
have a detrimental effect on the military order.6J
Should the military adopt a strict-scrutiny standard and require proof
that a regulation pursue a compelling interest with least restrictive means, or
a flat rule that automatically accommodates all religious needs of
servicemembers, or simply proceed on a case-by-case basis?
To adopt the strict-scrutiny standard would be to forego a long line of
cases recognizing that the military is a separate and distinct society where a
different application of constitutional protections are required. Further, the
courts would become directly involved in reviewing these cases, and would be
interfering in what should be the military's own role in performing its duties.
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Similarly, the military could not adopt a rigid rule which would allow
every religious practice to be accommodated. There is a need for loyalty,
cohesion and discipline. To adopt such a standard would not only be
inefficient and costly, but would individualize servicemembers to such an
extent as to undermine the military principle of uniformity. The best solution
would be to separate the various requests for religious accommodation into
categories and to come up with guidelines that can be used on a case-by-case
basis. For instance, specific regulations should be passed and implemented
regarding religious apparel, time-off for holidays and religious service, dietary
restrictions, and medical treatment.

Conscientious objection
The history of conscientious objector claims provides another basis for
analyzing religious-based exemptions from military regulations. Colonial law
generally exempted from compulsory military service anyone who objected to
participation as a matter of conscience. 64 In 1789, James Madison proposed
to include free exercise of conscience in the First Amendment. 65 This idea
was approved by the House of Representatives, but was deleted in the Senate
without any record of an explanation. 66
In 1863, however, when Congress enacted the first draft law,67 no
exemptions were provided for conscientious objectors. As a result of
pressures from various religious sects, Congress later granted an exemption
from combatant duty to those who were "conscientiously opposed to bearing
arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith
of their religious denominations ... 68
The Selective Draft Act of 191769 exempted persons from combatant
service if they belonged to "any well-recognized religious sect or organization
... whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war
of any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation
therein. "7Q However, this exemption applied only to combatant service-not
military service in general.
In the Selective Draft Law Cases,71 the Court rejected both
establishment and free-exercise clause challenges to conscientious objector
exemptions in the Draft Act of 1917.
It was not until World War II that the Supreme Court first considered
whether there was a First Amendment requirement to exempt conscientious
objectors from military service.72 Although the Court had explicitly held that
there was no constitutional right to conscientious objection, Congress provided
an exemption from induction to combat for conscientious objectors if their
opposition to participation in any war was based upon "religious training and
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belief. "73 Those who were granted the exemption were allowed as an
alternative to engage in other duties under civilian control as an alternative. 74
In Gillette v. United States,75 the Court held that the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment does not require exemption from military
service of those conscientiously opposed to participation in particular wars.
It was sufficient that the government's interests related directly to the burdens
its regulations imposed on free exercise rights. 76 In Johnson v. Robison77
a statute that denied veterans' education benefits to conscientious objectors
who performed alternate service was found not to violate the objectors' right
to free exercise of religion. In both cases the Court indicated that it will
require the government to show only a substantial interest rather than the
compelling interest required by Sherbert v. Verner.78 Thus it would appear
that Congress' constitutional power to raise and support armies is a sufficiently
substantial interest.

ill. Current practice, cases and controversies
Accommodation of religious practices in the military services is currently
governed by Department of Defense Directive Number 1300.17, issued
February 3, 1988. In principle, all requests for indulgence of religious
practices should be approved by commanders when such accommodation "will
not have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or
discipline ... 79
The directive lists various goals in implementation of the policy. In
pertinent part they are as follows:
a. Worship services, holy days, and Sabbath observance should
be accommodated, except when precluded by military necessity.
b. The Military Departments should include religious belief as
one factor for consideration when granting separate rations, and
permit commanders to authorize individuals to provide their own
supplemental food rations in a field or "at sea environment to
accommodate their religious beliefs.
c. The Military Departments should consider religious beliefs as
a factor for waiver of immunizations, subject to medical risks to
the unit and military requirements, such as alert status and
deployment potential.
d. The Military Departments should include relevant materials
on religious traditions, practices, and policies in the curricula
for command, judge advocate, chaplain, and similar courses and
orientations.
It
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e. The Military Departments should develop a statement
advising of DOD policy on individual religious practices and
military requirements to applicants for commissioning,
enlistment, and reenlistment. 80
Finally, the policy provides for the wearing of religious apparel both
visible and nonvisible. The latter may be worn with the uniform, provided
that it does not interfere with the performance of the servicemember's military
duties or with the proper wearing of any authorized article of the uniform. 81
Visible items may also be worn, "except under circumstances in which an item
is not neat and conservative or its wearing shall interfere with the performance
of the member's military duties. "82

Appearance standards
Military forces have long required uniformity of dress and appearance
as part of their practice of establishing and enforcing military discipline.
Goldman v. WeinbergerB is the most prominent recent case. Prior to
Goldman, three courts explored the extent to which military uniform
regulations infringe on the free-exercise rights of service members. In Geller
v. Secretary oj Dejense,84 the United States District Court for the District of
C01umbia ordered the Air Force to exempt an orthodox Jewish chaplain from
a grooming regulation which prohibited the wearing of a beard. The court
neither scrutinized the regulation nor applied the military-necessity doctrine.
Instead, it referred to the chaplain's commendable service record and his status
as a rabbi-a position where a beard is considered proper-and concluded that
the specific circumstances required an exception to be made for the "no-beard
regulation." The court also determined that it was not unnecessary to decide
betwcen judging the claim on a mere rationality test or Sherbert's compellinginterest test.&S The Air Force's interest in discipline, military image and
neatness was not sufficient, under either test, to justify the application of the
regulation because of the unique circumstances of the rabbi's case. 86
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit decided Sherwood v. Brown,87
which became the first instance in which a court applied a strict scrutiny test
to a claim to exemption from military appearance standards for religious
reasons. The Sherwood court considered whether a United States Navy dress
regulation that prohibited a Sikh sailor from wearing a turban violated his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Because the turban prevented
the sailor from wearing a protective helmet, said the court, the Navy could
assert its interest in the safety of the crew members who depended on him, the
court reasoned that the regulation met the compelling-interest test for
restricting the free exercise of religion. 88
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More recently, in Bittennan v. Secretary of Defense, 89 the question of
whether strict scrutiny should be applied once again came to the fore.
Bitterman, an orthodox Jew, sought to be exempted from Air Force
regulations which prevented him from wearing a yarmulke (skullcap) while in
uniform, under the free exercise clause. 90 The court followed the standard
adopted in Parker v. Levy and Brown v. Glines and concluded that its review
must include substantial deference to military judgments. 91 It found that a
compelling interest existed in applying Air Force uniform regulations to
Sergeant Bitterman's wearing of a yarmulke, and that departures from these
standards of uniformity would adversely affect teamwork, counteract pride,
and inhibit efforts to maintain morale and discipline. 92
Thus once again the cases in lower courts yield conflicting results.
Unfortunately Goldman did little to clear up the confusion. The Supreme
Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of an Air Force
regulation which prohibited an orthodox Jewish serviceman from wearing a
yarmulke while on duty. By a narrow (5-4) majority, the Court held that the
Air Force regulation did not infringe upon the serviceman's First Amendment
"free exercise" rights. Rejecting the argument that the strict-scrutiny standard
(enunciated in Sherbert) should be applied to Goldman's free-exercise claim,
Justice Rehnquist's opinion relied heavily on the military-necessity doctrine.
"Within the military community there is simply not the same (individual)
autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community ... 93 Furthermore, Said
Rehnquist, military regulations are to be reviewed with "far more" deference
than similar laws for civilian society .94
The majority of the Court concluded that "the desirability of dress
regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and
they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered
professional judgment," and as long as the military "reasonably and
evenhandedly" regulated dress requirements, the Court would allow the
regulation to stand. 9s Justice Stevens, concurring, agreed that military
regulatory judgments should be accorded extraordinary deference. He feared
that an exception for orthodox Jews wearing yarmulkes would force the Air
Force to draw distinctions among religions-something the Air Force had "no
business" doing. 96
The dissenting opinions in Goldman illustrate just how much the
military was in need of guidelines in the area of religious apparel. Justice
Blackmun felt that the precedents requiring a standard of strict scrutiny
controlled Dr. Goldman's claim, regardless of the fact that they were not
decided in military context. 97 Justice Brennan declared that Dr. Goldman
was denied a meaningful constitutional review because the Court applied a
"subrational" level of scrutiny to the military regulation. 98 And Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the judiciary should apply
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the same free exercise test in civilian and military contexts. 99 Her two
pronged test would require the government to demonstrate that the interest it
asserts against a religiously based claim "is of unusual importance" and that
granting an exemption would "do substantial harm to the especially important
government interest." UlO
Goldman has become the object of considerable criticism, the greatest
objection being its extreme deference to the military. Immediately following
the Circuit court's decision in Goldman, Congress ordered the Secretary of
Defense to form a study group "to examine ways to minimize the potential
conflict between the interests of members of the armed forces in abiding by
their religious tenets and the military interest in maintaining discipline." 101
In the category of dress and appearance, the study looked first toward the
military interest. It was determined that:
Contemporary research in the social and behavioral sciences
supports what institutions have recognized for centuries: dress
and appearance define who we are and what we are to ourselves
and to others within the military. Such identification contributes
signifIcantly to building discipline, individual morale, unit
cohesion, and service esprit de corps. . . . "It is a way of
converting individuals into members of a . . . group."
Uniformity not only directly imposes the discipline of the group,
but, more subtly, instills the self-discipline necessary for the
military member to perform effectively. 102
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The study group then looked toward the importance of recognizing an
individual's religious tenets, and concluded that the military had the
responsibility to meet these needs when possible.
The study group
recommended that non-visible items of apparel, when they do not constitute
health or safety hazards, should be permitted. 103
After the study, and while the Goldman case was working its way
through the courts, the Department of Defense promulgated a regulation
allowing various religious practices by service members (including the wearing
of a skullcap), unless military necessity dictated otherwise. 104 The Act
provides that members of the armed forces may wear items of religious
apparel while in uniform, except where the Secretary of Defense determines
that donning such apparel would interfere with the performance of military
duties, or where the apparel was not neat and conservative. lOS For example,
some religious dress or grooming requirements would violate safety standards:
beards may interfere with the proper fit of a gas mask; aircraft engines may
suck in loose clothing; and jewelry and loose clothing may be caught in
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electrical equipment. 106 The courts still need a way by which to judge future
free-exercise claims in the military.
The general practice of the United States military, not to make
exemptions for service members based on their religious beliefs,107 is derived
from British practice. As the Duke of Wellington stated: "If an officer or any
other member of the army is to be allowed to get rid of the discharge of a
disagreeable duty upon such a plea, there is an end to all discipline in the
army. "108
Congress took the first step in abandoning this narrow regard for
service members' free-exercise rights. The military should follow the
statutory guidelines; review by the courts should be based solely upon whether
the guidelines were applied properly. There should no longer be any concern
regarding the appropriate levels of scrutiny to apply.
Religious services and holidays
Outside of the military context, the Supreme Court has rendered a
number of conflicting judgments regarding accommodation for religious
services and holidays. In the early 1960s, the Court upheld various "blue
laws" which required businesses to close on Sunday, even though that is a
predominantly Christian day of worship.l09 Requests by Orthodox Jews and
other Sabbatarians for equal treatment have been deemed less important than
the government's asserted interest in a uniform day of rest. 110 But the Court
has also held that states may not force citizens to choose between observing
their day of religious worship and remaining eligible for unemployment
compensation. 111 And a similar conclusion was reached in a case involving
religious objection to manufacturing of armaments. 112
The armed forces' interest focuses on two intertwined considerations:
the effects on morale of accommodating ritual requirements of individual
servicemembers as well as esprit de corps, and the impact on military
effectiveness. 113 Currently, the normal peacetime work week allows the
great majority of American servicemembers to participate in the religious
services of their choosing. 114
But the military might not always be able to meet an individual's
worship needs. The Joint Study Group on religious matters led to a change
in Army Regulation 600-21, and set forth five factors in determining whether
to grant sincere requests for accommodation of religious practices. Under
these rules, commanders should consider the following:
a. the importance of military requirements in terms of
individual and unit readiness, health and safety, discipline,
morale, and cohesion;
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b. the religious importance of the accommodation to the
individual;
c. the cumulative impact of repeated accommodations of a
similar nature; ,
d. alternative means available to meet the requested
accommodation; and
e. previous treatment of the same or similar requests, including
treatment of similar requests made for other than religious
reasons. us
These guidelines are not absolute and the military will probably
continue to face conflicts between individual free exercise of religion and
military requirements. However, because of the increased emphasis on a caseby-case basis, decisions of the commanders will have a higher probability of
surviving judicial review.
Dietary laws
Various religions adhere to strict dietary requirements. For example,
certain Christian groups as well as Jews and Muslims prohibit the eating of
pork. Numerous faiths limit eating to specific hours, days, nights, or other
periods of time (such as a group of days or even weeks).1l6 Such
restrictions present a problem to those who keep strictly kosher, are
vegetarians, or have other religious dietary requirements. The primary interest
the military services have in servicemembers' diet stems from the obvious
relationship between diet and health and, thus, an individual's ability to
perform his assigned task. 117
Additionally, the military has to maintain a dining service that is both
efficient and cost effective, as well as one capable of adjusting quickly from
peacetime to wartime conditions.
On the one hand, if special diet
circumstances are not accommodated the servicemembers might not receive
adequate nutrition and individual performance may very well decrease. On the
other hand, however, if the military met all religious dietary tenets, a heavier
fmancial and administrative burden would be incurred. Hs
In this context the armed forces can be analogous to a prison system.
Both have a strong interest in maintaining internal discipline through
regimentation and uniformity. The Supreme Court in dealing with prison
cases has declared that prisoners do not leave their Constitutional rights at the
prison gate. 119 In Cruz v. Beto,120 the Court established the requirement
that prison authorities ensure all prisoners a reasonable opportunity to practice
their religion freely. 121 In Kanane v. Carlson,l22 the Second Circuit
upheld a Jewish prisoner's right to a kosher diet, requiring the government to
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demonstrate that refusal to serve kosher food to orthodox Jewish prisoners was
the least-restrictive means of achieving a substantial penal goal; the fact that
such accommodation presented minor difficulties for other prisoners was not
substantial enough to justify denying kosher food to orthodox Jewish
prisoners. 123 However, in United States v. HUSS/ 24 a New York court
upheld the prison's denial of kosher food to Jewish prisoners because the
denial was reasonably related to the prison's interest in keeping down costs
and affording all prisoners equal treatment. Thus courts have utilized both a
strict-scrutiny test and a rational basis test in dietary cases-with opposite
results.
Several federal cases involving prisoners' religious rights have been
decided subsequent to Smith. One in particular, Hunafa v. Murphy, 125
suggested that an inmate's first amendment claim to a pork-free diet might not
survive application of the new Smith standard.
Again, the Joint Study Group had various recommendations for
accommodating dietary restrictions of military service members. It was
determined that to the extent the military can provide meals for individuals
with dietary restrictions (especially where this can be done without the
appearance of special or favored treatment), there would be a positive impact
on morale. 126 The Group recommends first that the military continue to
work to meet the dietary and nutritional needs of servicemembers, as well as
address their variety of tasteS. 127 Where separate rations are a possible
alternative, it recommends that the military include religious reasons as a
factor to be considered in granting allowances. Although special demands of
field and sea conditions impose constraints on both the military and on the
individual, where feasible the military should continue to allow its personnel
to give out food rations when military conditions permit (or allow
servicemembers to prepare their own special meals).I28 In addition, the
military should consider the feasibility of developing combat rations that can
be used universally and which also meet the dietary restrictions of as many
servicemembers as possible. 129
Medical treatment

Can military personnel refuse medical treatment because of their
religious beliefs? If they are sincere, then the Constitutional question is
whether their own physical well-being or that of their comrades-in-arms
justifies infringement of their free exercise rights. 130 Both the military and
civilian precedents have consistently held that inoculations and medical
treatment for various injuries can be administered over the objections of the
patient-whether such objections are based on religious or other grounds. 131
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The military must be concerned with both the physical and spiritual well-being
of its service members, and with the efficient use of its medical systems. 132
Current military practice allows exemption from routine inoculations in
peacetime situations.133
These decisions are on a case-by-case basis;
exemptions are not permanent. For example, exemptions have been granted
from having to receive flu shots because of the reduced chance of getting ill
in situations where most others have been inoculated, and in view of the fact
that flu viruses most of the time have a limited effect. On the other hand, the
military is reluctant to grant permanent exemptions from immunizations since
military forces frequently leave the confines of the United States, and service
members without inoculations have historically contracted a wide variety of
diseases. The current practice is that if one has a medical exemption for
inoculations but is being assigned to a location that requires specific
immunization, the individual is required to receive the inoculation or will not
be assigned to that location. 134
The question remains: Can the military permit individuals with sincere
religious beliefs the right to refuse medical treatment? The answer is probably
"no." Not only would there be an increased legal and moral burden on the
military's medical services, but also a potential for a servicemember to be
away from duty for extended periods of time. Furthermore, there is a
possibility of spreading disease to others and a limitation in the amount of
assignments. In wartime, especially, it is important to be able to gather
manpower in maximum numbers. In contrast, in peacetime situations, it might
be possible to continue the current practice of allowing certain exemptions on
a case-by-case basis.
It was recommended by the Joint Study Group that the military continue
its case-by-case immunization practices, but only when it would not adversely
affect a servicemember's health or interfere with his/her ability to carry out
the appropriate duties.135 In order that there be consistent treatment among
religious groups desiring these medical exemptions, a clearer set of guidelines
or regulations should be promulgated.
Military chaplaincy
The creation of the military chaplaincy by Congress is consistent with
a tradition that began prior to the adoption of the Constitution.136 When the
Continental Army was formed those chaplains associated with the militia of the
thirteen colonies became part of the country's first national army.137 When
the Constitution was adopted (and even prior to the ratification of the first
amendment), Congress authorized the appointment of a commissioned Army
chaplain. 138 In establishing the Army (Article I, Section 8), Congress
required that it consist of all persons "necessary to form the basis for a
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complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in case of
emergency. "139 Authorization was provided for the creation of a Chief of
Chaplains, and for commissioned and other officers to be appointed as
chaplains. 140
Today, the primary function of the military chaplain is to engage in
activities designed to meet the religious needs of a "pluralistic military
community, including military personnel and their dependents." 141 In
response to an increased desire for religious accommodation, the chaplains
provide a myriad of services such as conducting religious services, furnishing
religious education, and counseling service members. "142
It also appears that the free exercise clause compels Congress to make
religion available to service members who have been moved by the Army to
areas where religion of their own denomination is unavailable to them. 143
Conclusion
A review of Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that the military has
little guidance for an appropriate standard of review when deciding various
religion-based exemptions in military settings. Congress has taken the first
step by setting forth regulations which the military can implement on a case
by-case basis (especially that regarding religious apparel). The Joint Study
Group went into an explicit analysis by detailing religious practices and their
potential impact on the military interest. Consequently its recommendations
were soundly based.
Congress should continue to act on the Joint Study Group's
recommendations by formulating guidelines to which military personnel can
refer in order to analyze each potential conflicting situation regarding
servicemembers' free exercise of religion rights. This would include guidance
in dealing with religious holidays, dietary restrictions, and medical treatment.
Not every situation will fit neatly into specific categories: a case-by-case
analysis which follows these guidelines and weighs the competing interests is
needed. The courts can thereby avoid getting involved in "military issues,"
deciding instead whether the congressional guidelines have been properly
followed.
Because of the many historical, cultural, and religious differences
involved, it is difficult to compare American military practices with those of
other countries in order to perhaps come up with a "better" system, but such
comparisons illustrate the relatively liberal regulations in the U.S. armed
forces. The trend in the United States allows even more freedom to
servicepeople to practice religion fully-a trend which many hope is likely to
continue. However, it is incumbent upon Congress to step forward and offer
appropriate statutory guidance.
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The Supreme Court has long presumed the supremacy of the First
Amendment, and has often re-affumed the very heavy burden of proof it
forces the powers-that-be to overcome. Even the current Justices, who in all
probability would continue paying deferential homage to the military's own
definitions of "military necessity," would not likely uphold the regulations
handed down during Operation Desert Storm. Even they, one hopes, would
fmd it hard to see how chaplains setting up a plastic Christmas tree in a tent,
or wearing religious insignia on their uniforms, or holding a prayer service,
could possibly harm a military mission. It may be wrong to invest that much
faith in this Court, but any ruling to the contrary would represent a harsh
abandonment of long-held American values. It's incumbent on all of us to
keep them honest.
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